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Abstract Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors
can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition
in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are
experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become
known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise
defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion
is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the notion of ‘philosophical expertise’
in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in
philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence
that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach
is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be
unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical
expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent
developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and
can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that intuitions about philosophi-
cally interesting concepts are subject to surprising variation and marked susceptibility
to cognitive biases. From these findings, some philosophers (henceforth ‘Critics’)
conclude that appealing to intuitions for the purposes of philosophical inquiry is
methodologically problematic, and that at least some degree of scepticism about this
practice is in order. In response, others (henceforth ‘Defenders’) have claimed that
philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—
this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’.1
Our paper explores the viability of this defence, and argues that there is empiri-
cal evidence to suggest that it can be partially vindicated. Central to our view is the
proposal that extant discussions of the expertise defence are unsatisfactory because
they do not account for important methodological distinctions amongst practices of
philosophical inquiry. To set up our argument, we first briefly review the two most
prominent approaches to formulating the expertise defence and show how they oper-
ate with a problematic assumption: namely, that the expertise defence either stands
or falls wholesale (Sect. 2). We argue that the many ways in which intuitions are
put to use in philosophical inquiry engender distinct types of philosophical exper-
tise, and that wholesale defences or rejections of the expertise defence are thereby
unwarranted–instead, we argue that local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical
expertise are better suited to assess the expertise defence (Sect. 3). In more detail, we
suggest that the expertise defence must be sensitive to the cognitive underpinnings of
intuitions appealed to within philosophy (Sect. 3.1), and to different implementations
of thought-experiments (Sect. 3.2), and argue that neglecting these distinctions signifi-
cantly inhibits our thinking about the expertise defence (Sect. 3.3). Finally, in the spirit
of taking our own advice, we demonstrate how recent developments in experimental
philosophy (viz. cognitive epistemology) enable a piecemeal assessment of philosoph-
ical intuitions and, crucially, provides empirical support for at least one instance of a
successful expertise defence (Sect. 4).
2 Current approaches to the expertise defence
The expertise defence is primarily motivated by the observation that most experi-
mental critiques of intuitions rely on data gathered from studying non-philosophers.
Defenders point out that we might naturally think philosophers are just better equipped
than non-philosophers to engage in philosophical inquiry. If so, then the force of many
experimental critiques rests on an illicit inference: that failures affecting the judge-
ments of non-philosophers generalise to the judgements of expert philosophers.
1 This is not the only way that philosophers have responded to Critics. Another prominent line of response
can be found in Cappelen (2012), Deutsch (2015) who argue that intuitions play no important evidential
role in philosophy and that, therefore, experimental challenges have little to no relevance for philosophical
theorising. We set these critiques aside here (for a response: Nado 2016); we assume that intuitions do play
a role in philosophy, and that defenders of appeals to intuitions in philosophy must grasp the nettle and
respond to experimental critiques.
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Although this response has a ring of plausibility, it requires considerable precisifica-
tion. We will organise our discussion around two independent claims that any version
of the expertise defence needs to establish:
1. Philosophers have philosophical expertise—adequate training in philosophy leads
to improved performance in some task(s).
2. Philosophical expertise defends philosophers from distorting factors that Critics
claim undermines the practice of appealing to intuitions in philosophy.
So, what could the nature of the expertise be that philosophical training brings
about, and how might it help philosophers avoid deleterious biases? In this section, we
review and critique two natural responses to this question. Firstly, we outline and reject
the ‘expert intuitions’ defence—the view that locates philosophical expertise in the
superior intuitions of philosophers. Secondly, we outline and critique the more plau-
sible ’expert practices’ defence, which locates philosophical expertise in the superior
methods employed by philosophers.
2.1 Expert intuitions
Call the suggestion that philosophical expertise yields superior intuitions the expert
intuition defence. In line with the criteria outlined above, this amounts to the following
proposal:
Expert Intuition Defence Philosophical training leads philosophers to have intu-
itions that are substantially less susceptible to the distorting effects influencing the
intuitions of non-philosophers.
There are several ways to flesh out this basic suggestion. For instance, Kauppinen
(2007) proposes that philosophers bring a distinctive kind of reflective intuition to bear
on philosophical cases. Ludwig (2007) argues that philosophers are apt to provide intu-
itions that stem from conceptual competence alone, rather than responses influenced
by other factors (such as pragmatic implicatures). Both versions of Expert Intuitions
contrast the intuitions at play in philosophical discourse with the quick, spontaneous
responses provided by non-philosophers to experimental surveys. Their hope is that
the more refined intuitions of philosophers respect fine-grained distinctions elided by
the folk, whilst stripping out the influence of various irrelevant factors and routine
inattentiveness to cases.
Although it might seem promising to deny the symmetry between the intuitions
of philosophers and quick judgements participants provide in experimental surveys,
Expert Intuitions Defence is a difficult position to maintain. Firstly, there is substantial
empirical evidence that many of our judgements in a variety of domains are susceptible
to errors due to the effect of cognitive biases.2 If the influence of biases are a pervasive
part of human psychology, susceptibility to bias in philosophical discourse—like in
other domains—is a fair default assumption. Furthermore, Critics have already gath-
ered a small but growing body of recent evidence suggesting that trained philosophers
2 However, it is crucial to emphasise that not all biases have negative distorting effects (Antony 2016). In
this paper we restrict use of the term ‘bias’ to those negative distorting effects.
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display no particular immunity to cognitive biases (for reviews, see: Machery 2015;
Mizrahi 2015). Without countervailing empirical evidence, it is hard to see how we
could be justified in holding the sort of exceptionalism Defenders wish to attribute to
professional philosophers.3 Biases are prevalent in all sorts of judgements and specific
measures are required to ameliorate their influence; believing against the empirical
evidence that philosophers’ intuitions are somehow immune to these biases seems to
be an article of faith rather than a well-supported position.
2.2 Expert practices
The issues facing Expert Intuitions have led some to conclude that preoccupation with
intuitions simpliciter is misguided. Jennifer Nado succinctly captures this worry:
[The] focus on intuition is somewhat odd, given that it is in no way essential to
the expertise defence; philosophical methodology obviously consists in much
more than the gathering of intuitive judgements, and there are therefore many
potential loci for philosophical expertise.
(Nado 2014a, p. 1029)
Nado goes on to suggest that philosophers “display expertise in assessing, cri-
tiquing, and (when appropriate) rejecting or explaining away” the data gathered by
the method of cases (Nado 2014a, p. 1041).4 Williamson (2011) also shows dissatis-
faction with the narrow focus on intuitions; in this sense, he characterises philosophical
expertise as the improved performance in the use of thought experiments in philosoph-
ical inquiry—by which he means the evaluation, assessment, and deployment of them
in theorising (Williamson 2011, pp. 224–225).5 And there are interesting yet brief
comments along similar lines to be found in Rini (2015, §3). We take these comments
to suggest philosophical expertise is to be found in what philosophers do with intu-
itions. As an attempt to provide a rough locus for our discussion that remains neutral on
various metaphilosophical positions, we will characterise the variety of philosophical
practices that might be promising for the expertise defence as follows:
Philosophical Practices Philosophers elicit, invoke, assess, and synthesise intu-
itions about philosophical cases.6
Attempts to locate philosophical expertise in what philosophers do with intuitions
is a significant improvement on previous intuition-focused proposals of the expertise
defence: we agree with Nado that there is more to philosophy than simple reliance on
3 See also Weinberg et al. (2012).
4 It is noteworthy that Nado endorses an account of philosophical expertise that does not support the
expertise defence.
5 Neither Nado nor Williamson phrase their accounts in terms of ‘intuitions’, arguing that intuition-talk is
theoretically inert and often leads to confusion. However, our use of ‘intuitions’ here is roughly equivalent to
‘judgements elicited from philosophical cases’, which both Nado and Williamson refer to in their accounts.
6 We borrow this description of how philosophers use intuitions in philosophy from Fischer and Collins
(2015, p. 11).
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intuition, and that this broader nexus of practices must be taken into account when
examining the nature of philosophical expertise.
However, we argue that extant formulations of this approach remain problematic.
Specifically, we suggest that these attempts to refine the locus of philosophical exper-
tise are problematically monolithic. By this, we mean that current approaches imply
that the philosophical expertise relevant to Philosophical Practices consists of: (i)
a single package of (ii) general philosophical skills that are (iii) shared by all/most
philosophers, and are (iv) apt to be successfully deployed across a range of philo-
sophical contexts.7 This monolithic view has important ramifications for how we
think about the expertise defence which, recall, is roughly composed of two claims:
(1) Philosophers have philosophical expertise—adequate training in philosophy leads
to improved performance in some task(s); and (2) Philosophical expertise defends
philosophers from distorting factors that critics claim undermines the practice of
appealing to intuitions in philosophy. The monolithic account of philosophical exper-
tise currently implied in the literature leaves us with two basic possibilities:
Expert-Practices Defence Philosophers display improved performance in the
practices of eliciting, invoking, assessing, and synthesizing intuitions for purposes
of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, this suffices to shield philosophers from mis-
takes and problems afflicting non-philosophers when appealing to intuitions in
philosophical inquiry.
No Expert-Practices Defence Philosophers display improved performance in the
practices of eliciting, invoking, assessing, and synthesizing intuitions for purposes
of philosophical inquiry. However, this does not suffice to shield philosophers from
mistakes and problems afflicting non-philosophers when appealing to intuitions
in philosophical inquiry.
These two options capture the tendency—prevalent in the literature—to either defend
or refute the expertise defence simpliciter. That is, both sides in the debates about
the expertise defence advance accounts which say that, whatever the relevant form of
philosophical expertise consists in, it either univocally does or does not support the
expertise defence (Williamson 2007, 2011; Kauppinen 2007; Ludwig 2007; Weinberg
et al. 2010; Tobia et al. 2013; Nado 2014a; Machery 2015; Rini 2015).
We propose that any such extreme pessimism or optimism is unwarranted. Specif-
ically, we will argue that this way of construing the expertise defence rests on an
inadequate conception of philosophical expertise that neglects important distinctions
7 There has been some recognition in the literature of the need to distinguish between types of ’philosophical
expertise’ when investigating the expertise defence. For instance, Weinberg et al. (2010, p. 335) recognise
that there is an important distinction to be drawn between improved performance in “close analysis of texts,
or the critical assessment of arguments” and improved performance “at conducting thought experiments”. In
a similar vein Nado (2014a, p. 1041) distinguishes expertise in the “construction of thought experiments” and
reflecting on philosophical theories, viz. “teasing out their consequences, determining their compatibility
with other positions, and so forth.” After drawing such distinctions, Nado and Weinberg are concerned
with asking whether these types of expertise might plausibly shield philosophers from bias; on this front,
they find little grounds for optimism. However, when philosophical expertise is put in this way, the expert
practices defence begins to look rather unpromising. After all, even if philosophers are better than the
average person at analysing texts, or coming up with intriguing thought-experiments, this doesn’t seem apt
to protect them against the multiplicity of biases identified by Critics.
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among tasks encompassed by Philosophical Practices. We advance an alternative
option, not identified in the literature, that aims to be more faithful to the complex
reality of such practices. The main thrust of our proposal is the idea that the rela-
tion between philosophical expertise and the expertise defence is considerably more
intricate than the binary choice between No Expert-Practices Defence and Expert-
Practices Defence. More precisely, we argue for the following:
Expert-Practices Defences Some philosophers display improved performance in
certain sets of practices in eliciting, invoking, assessing, and synthesizing intu-
itions for purposes of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, this suffices to shield those
philosophers from specific mistakes and problems afflicting non-philosophers
when appealing to intuitions in philosophical inquiry.
In the following section, we motivate Expert-Practices Defences by arguing that
the diversity of practices described under Philosophical Practices engender distinct
types of philosophical expertise. In this sense, we suggest that philosophical expertise
in such practices consists of: (i) a diverse package of (ii) specific philosophical skills
that are (iii) shared by some philosophers, and are (iv) apt to be successfully deployed
only in a narrow range of philosophical contexts. To articulate this view, we detail two
methodologically important distinctions that are overlooked in current discussions
of philosophical practices: first, between the types of cognitive processes underlying
philosophical intuitions, and second, among the different ways in which thought-
experiments can be put to use in philosophical inquiry. We then demonstrate why
eliding these distinctions fails to enable an informative evaluation of the expertise
defence.
3 Finessing the expertise defence
3.1 Cognitive processes
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that intuitions do not form a
homogenous class of mental states.8 This claim is rather plausible: there do seem to
be significant differences between, for instance, intuitive judgements about whether
a subject knows some proposition, and whether pushing people in front of trains for
the greater good is morally permissible. Given the superficial dissimilarities between
these intuitions, it is quite natural to wonder whether the practices subsumed under
Philosophical Practices will fare equally well with respect to each of these intuitions.
We will argue that they do not, and that discussion of philosophical practices would
benefit from taking into account the differences between distinct intuitions.
Recent developments in experimental philosophy provide empirical evidence sug-
gesting that philosophical inquiry should distinguish between different types of
philosophical intuitions. The studies in question employ techniques and findings from
the empirical sciences with the aim of identifying the particular cognitive processes
8 Nado (2014b) provides a very clear discussion of these points.
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underlying our philosophical intuitions.9 For current purposes, we need only detail
developments from two such lines of inquiry.
The first concerns recent proposals that seek to trace back a certain class of epistemic
intuitions to the operation of a set of specific cognitive processes. The epistemic intu-
itions in question concern intuitive knowledge-attributions: judgements about what
other people may or may not know under certain circumstances—e.g., whether peo-
ple can know the time from a stopped clock, even if it is only by sheer luck that the
clock indicates the correct time at that very moment. In a set of recent papers, Nagel
(2012a, b), Boyd and Nagel (2014) offers a psychological explanation of these intu-
itive knowledge-attributions. Making use of a large body of findings from cognitive
psychology, Nagel proposes that these intuitions stem from the exercise of the ordi-
nary psychological capacities for ‘mind-reading’—i.e., a set of automatic cognitive
processes that humans routinely rely on in order to understand and predict the mental
states of others.
The second strand of research we wish to call attention to concerns recent attempts
to identify the cognitive underpinnings of intuitions about whether inflicting harm can
ever be morally permissible, if doing so would bring about some greater good. Most
empirical inquiry into the nature of these intuitive judgements seeks to pinpoint the
specific processes driving people’s responses to the so-called ‘Trolley Problem’—i.e.,
cases where people are asked if it would be morally permissible to in some way alter
the course of a run-away trolley in order to save many people, at the cost of sacrificing
the life of one person (for a discussion: Thomson 1985). A number of empirical
investigations into the nature of these intuitions provide robust neuroscientific evidence
suggesting that the intuition according to which it would not be morally permissible
to alter the course of the trolley—thus sacrificing one to save the many—are driven by
a negative emotional response to this case (for a review: Greene 2015, pp. 700–706).
Thus, these studies suggest that our verdicts in response to the ‘Trolley Problem’ are
shaped by the affective processes we bring to bear when considering it.
These empirical findings provide evidence that there are in fact significant dis-
similarities between the many types of intuitions that philosophers appeal to in
philosophical inquiry. Specifically, they illustrate how different intuitions can be driven
by distinct cognitive processes. Now, one may ask why any of this is relevant for an
evaluation of the expertise defence. Here’s why: these discoveries reveal how different
intuitions are susceptible to distinctive kinds of biases. To explain, let’s first turn to
empirical evidence of the biases afflicting intuitive knowledge-attributions.
One hotly debated topic in contemporary epistemology concerns whether the stan-
dards for knowledge are sensitive to the error possibilities that are made salient in a
given context (DeRose 1992; Cohen 1999). A central issue driving these debates is
the observation that people are usually more willing to attribute knowledge to others
when no possibilities of error are made salient; however, once such possibilities are
raised, most people feel the temptation to retract such attributions. This amounts to
a startling pattern of judgements, given that the orthodoxy has it that merely men-
tioning the possibility of error should not shift the standards for knowledge. Building
9 Indeed, as Knobe (2016) suggests, most contemporary work in experimental philosophy is practised as
cognitive science.
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on psychological explanations of intuitive knowledge attributions in terms of ‘mind-
reading’ capacities, Nagel (2012b) makes a move for the orthodox view. Specifically,
she argues that these patterns of intuitive judgement are due to a specific psychological
bias known as epistemic egocentrism, or the curse of knowledge. Simplifying, this bias
amounts to a tendency to wrongly predict the mental states of other subjects who stand
in epistemic positions that are more naive than one’s own. In these situations, most
people erroneously represent others’ perspectives as if they shared their own privileged
epistemic standing—and, moreover, they tend to penalise others (e.g., retract knowl-
edge attributions) for not responding to the evidence as they think appropriate from
their privileged epistemic standing. Subsequent empirical investigations have borne
out the predictions of this psychological explanation, providing additional evidence
that changes in intuitive knowledge-attributions in the light of possibilities of error
can indeed be explained in terms of the egocentrism bias (Alexander et al. 2015).
Let us now turn to a different set of debates: namely, discussions about the Doc-
trine of Double Effect (DDE)—i.e., the principle which states that it is sometimes
permissible to bring about harm as a side-effect of aiming to bring about some good,
even though it would be impermissible to bring about the same harm as a means of
bringing about the same good. One of the central lines of support for the DDE is that
it neatly predicts typical responses to certain complex morally charged scenarios. For
instance, this principle nicely captures one common response-pattern to two variants
of the Trolley-Problem:10
Lever A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the track
and who will be killed unless something is done. Patrick may pull a lever, which
will redirect the trolley onto a second track, saving the five people. However, on
this second track is an innocent bystander (Susy), who will be killed if the trolley
is turned onto this track.
Push A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the track
and who will be killed unless something is done. Patrick can push an innocent
bystander (Susy) in front of the trolley. The runaway trolley would be stopped by
hitting (and killing) Susy, but would thereby save the five people on the track.
According to the DDE, it would (i) be permissible to stop a train from killing five
people by pulling a lever to divert the train onto a second track, leading to the death
of one person, but (ii) it would not permissible to push one person onto the track—
thereby killing them, but stopping the train—in order to prevent the train from killing
five people. Indeed, this is precisely the pattern of responses most people have when
they evaluate these cases. But here’s the rub: studies show that people can be primed
to give different judgements to Lever and Push, simply by modifying the order in
which these cases are presented to them (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012, 2015).
For instance, if one is presented with the Push case first then you are more likely to
judge the subsequent Lever case to be impermissible. One prominent explanation for
why people are susceptible to such order effects is the operation of an affective bias:
one’s judgements are being prompted by an unreflective consideration of one’s emo-
tional state. By using one’s immediate emotional reaction as a benchmark, we become
10 These formulations are modified from Liao et al. (2012).
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disposed to changes in intuitive response depending on whether we are presented with
an emotionally ‘potent’ variation of the thought-experiment (such as pushing a person
to their death) in the first instance or later on (for a discussion: Greene 2015).
What is the upshot of all this? It shows that particular biases and errors afflicting
certain intuitions are not likely to arise for others. And as a result, different skills
will be required to successfully appeal to an expertise defence within some lines of
philosophical inquiry than in others. For instance, an expertise defence for philosophers
working specifically on the Trolley-problem will require them to deploy practices that
can shield them from certain affective biases11 (in order to either prevent the biases,
or to ameliorate their effects on their intuitions) whilst another philosopher working
on the relationship between knowledge and stakes will have to be cautious regarding
biases such as epistemic egocentrism. These are skills that they require in virtue of their
lines of inquiry engaging different cognitive processes.12 Therefore, asking whether
expert philosophical practices suffice for an expertise defence cannot be carried out
in an intuition-general way; the sorts of biases one is susceptible to in a given line of
inquiry, and the skills and practices required to offset these biases, will depend on the
cognitive processes producing one’s intuitions.
To take stock, we have briefly documented recent developments in experimental
philosophy indicating that our intuitions are underwritten by very distinct kinds of
cognitive processes. Furthermore, we explained how these psychological explanations
of our intuitions reveal them to be vulnerable to a variety of distinct biases. We then
argued that these distinctions are methodologically significant, insofar as they suggest
that distinct skills are required to offset biases afflicting different intuitions. These
findings provide an initial attack on the monolithic interpretation of philosophical
expertise—which holds that expertise in the tasks under Philosophical Practices
amount to one set of general skills.
In what follows, we underscore yet another important methodological distinction
that the monolithic interpretation fails to account for—viz., between different ways of
implementing thought-experiments in philosophical inquiry—and outline its relevance
for assessing the expertise defence. We then conclude this section by discussing an
alternative approach to delineating philosophical expertise that can accommodate for
these distinctions, and which allows for a more informative evaluation of the expertise
defence.
11 Of course, this isn’t to say the ethical judgements should be free from affective influences tout court. We
only make the uncontroversial point that, since order effects are clearly undesirable, ethicists must ensure
that affective influences do not leave them vulnerable to such a deleterious bias.
12 Again, this distinction cannot neatly be drawn by looking at areas of philosophy. For instance, it is
noteworthy that some studies have found that considerations with moral valence can influence knowledge
attributions (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010). This implies that it is at least possible that affective processes
may shift epistemic attributions, too. These initial results further support our suggestion that our focus
should be on the specific cognitive processes our inquiries engage, not on the philosophical domain we take
ourselves to be working in.
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3.2 Different uses of thought-experiments
Philosophers use thought-experiments in a variety of different ways. However, these
distinct uses have not received equal scrutiny in the methodological literature. Here
are three rather different ways that
Standard Uses Firstly, and most prominently, philosophers use thought-
experiments to elicit judgements which are used to defend or refute claims about
concepts, folk theories, and/or the phenomena such concepts and folk theories are
about. These uses of thought-experiments, what we are calling Standard uses,
are widespread and familiar within the philosophical literature. The canonical
examples are Gettier-cases. For most people, considering the details of Gettier-
like scenarios cues a particular judgement—namely that subjects lack knowledge
in certain ‘lucky’ conditions—and this judgement, in turn, is frequently used to
defend a negative answer to the philosophical question ‘is knowledge reducible
to justified true belief?’ Other famous examples of Standard uses of thought-
experiments include Kripke’s (1980) use of the Gödel case against descriptivist
theories, Parfit’s (1984) use of fission cases to argue against certain theories of
personal identity, and Jackson’s (1982) use of the Mary case to argue against
Physicalism. In all these cases, the application of the thought-experiment seeks
to elicit specific judgements, and then uses these judgements to answer some
philosophical question.
Aporetic Uses Secondly, some thought-experiments are used in order to elicit
conflicting judgements about the same scenario. We will call these Aporetic uses
of thought experiments, to indicate that they are meant to give rise to a kind of
puzzlement that helps to refine inquiry into their subject-matter.13 A simple exam-
ple is the case of the ship of Theseus: “is a ship that has had all of its components
gradually replaced on the course of a voyage the same ship on arrival as on depar-
ture?” Most people feel the pull of both the positive and negative answers: in one
sense, it is indeed the same ship; but, in another, it seems that by substituting all
of its parts we now have an entirely different ship (for discussions: Smart 1972;
Scaltsas 1980; Lowe 1983). This thought-experiment thus gives rise to a sense of
puzzlement about the notion of identity, which can then be put to use in refining
inquiry. For instance, if it turns out that the intuitive pull of each answer corre-
sponds to a different concept of identity, then philosophers will have to hone their
inquiry accordingly. Newcomb’s problem is another instance of an Aporetic use
of a thought-experiment. This is a puzzle that elicits two plausible yet inconsistent
judgements about rational attitudes (Nozick 1969).14 Reflection on this problem
has led to animated (and ongoing) discussions about the source of the puzzlement;
it has promoted philosophers to draw novel distinctions and formulate questions
13 One philosopher who has discussed the paradoxical nature of certain thought-experiments is Sorensen
(1998).
14 As a recent poll suggests, people tend to diverge almost evenly on both judgements: from 31,854
votes, 53.5% chose one judgement and 46.5% chose the other (https://www.theguardian.com/science/
alexs-adventures-in-numberland/2016/nov/30/newcombs-problem-which-side-won-the-guardians-philo
sophy-poll).
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that attempt make inquiry into rational attitudes more precise. (For instance, New-
comb’s paradox shows that there are cases where the decision-theoretic principle
of dominance gives advice that conflicts with the principle of expected utility-
maximization; this is a surprising result as it dissociates our judgements about
rationality from the predictions of standard decision-theory.) In sum, Aporetic
uses of thought-experiments significantly improve philosophical inquiry, to the
extent that they tease out important distinctions that help us to better understand
central philosophical notions.
Critical Uses A third way to use thought-experiments is to invoke particular intu-
itions in order to scrutinise which aspects of the specified case elicit them. Insights
into which features of a case are responsible for eliciting certain intuitions can
then be used in assessing the evidential value of those intuitions. Critical uses of
thought-experiments are not predominant in the philosophical literature, yet they
are arguably amongst the most discerning. One such example is Gendler’s (2010)
close scrutiny of a range of thought-experiments about personal identity. From
this detailed analysis, she concludes that some of the most prominent thought-
experiments used in the literature are just too far divorced from the situations in
which we ordinarily apply the concept of personal identity. Her central contention
is that our intuitions about such cases are thereby unlikely to track features essen-
tial to the concept of personal identity, making them useless for philosophical
theorising. Another example of a Critical use is Jackson’s (2003) later appeal to
the case of Mary the Neuroscientist, where he attempts to diagnose why this case
tends to elicit the intuition that Mary does indeed learn something new when she
sees the red rose for the first time. Jackson invokes this intuition as a foil for his
argument, which aims to show that this judgement turns on a mistaken conception
of the nature of perceptual experience—viz., one which erroneously characterises
experience in terms of what it’s like. On these grounds, he proposes that we ought
to reject this intuition, and that the case of Mary the Neuroscientist is inadequate
for philosophical purposes.15
These three different ways to conduct philosophical inquiry have not—as far as we
know—been separated out in the literature on the expertise defence. Critics have over-
whelmingly focused on Standard uses, marshalling experimental evidence in order to
argue that the practice of appealing to intuitions in this way is massively susceptible to
truth-irrelevant factors. However, separating out different uses of thought-experiments
reveals there to be a number of different practices that philosophers use in dealing with
intuitions about cases. In other words, there is no single practice of eliciting, invoking,
assessing and synthesising intuitions. The distinctions between Standard, Aporetic,
and Critical illustrates at least some differences in how these practices can be put to
use in philosophical inquiry.
The relevance of these distinctions is that these practices may have different epis-
temic profiles with respect to the influence of deleterious biases. To see this, consider
15 Another prominent example of a Critical use of thought-experiments is Dennett’s (1991, pp. 437–440)
critical examination of Searle’s Chinese Room scenario. Additionally, the recent literature in experimental
philosophy provides examples of empirically-informed Critical uses of thought-experiments: e.g., Nagel
(2011), Fischer (2014) and Alexander et al. (2017).
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how different uses of thought-experiment are used to inquire into the same philosoph-
ical issue—the nature, and perhaps the varieties of, personal identity. For example,
Parfit’s fission cases can be used as an argument for a particular view within debates
about personal identity, and Gendler’s use of various thought-experiments was used
to reject the relevance of certain intuitions for theorising about personal identity. All
of these turn out to be cases of eliciting, invoking, assessing and synthesising judge-
ments about cases, but each for rather different purposes. Even if it were the case
that Critics could adduce empirical evidence to demonstrate that Standard usages
within this inquiry are susceptible to the influence of truth-irrelevant factors (e.g. order
effects, affective biases, etc.), this would not be evidence that the Critical use of this
thought-experiments are similarly susceptible. After all, it is plausible that Critical
implementations of these thought-experiments could pick up on exactly these biases.
Although this in itself is an interesting hypothesis for the dialectic surrounding the
expertise defence, more will be required to push back against the experimental Critic.
Specifically, it will need to be shown that certain uses of thought-experiments can in
fact shield philosophers from the effect of biases and truth-irrelevant factors. In the
final section, we will discuss recent empirical evidence that suggests that a Critical
use of a particular thought-experiment, applied to one particular line of inquiry, dos
indeed succeed in uncovering and shielding philosophers from the effect of bias and
truth-irrelevant influences that have been found to affect the Standard use of that
same thought-experiment in that line of inquiry.
3.3 Discussion
In this section, we have called attention to two important methodological distinctions
that have been neglected in evaluations of the expertise defence. In particular, we
suggest that the dominant monolithic interpretation of philosophical expertise does
not adequately accommodate for distinctions between the various uses of thought-
experiments in philosophical inquiry, nor the particular cognitive processes underlying
philosophical intuitions.16
In line with the arguments in this section, we suggest that Expert-Practices
Defences is a better way to think about the relation of support between philosophical
expertise and the expertise defence. Recall, this is proposal that some philosophers
display improved performance in a particular set of practices in eliciting, invoking,
assessing, and synthesising intuitions, and that this suffices to shield those philoso-
phers from particular deleterious effects on philosophical theorising. This proposal
better accommodates the fact that philosophical expertise with respect to Philosophi-
cal Practices can stand in a variable relation of support to the expertise defence. Recall,
the reason for this is that the many distinctions amongst the Philosophical Practices
engender distinct types of philosophical expertise, some of which may shield philoso-
phers from biases, whilst others do not.
16 We should note that we do not argue that philosophical expertise should be carved only at the joints
of these distinctions; rather, we merely illustrate some ways that current accounts fail to accommodate the
possibility that different types of philosophical expertise.
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The central upshot of Expert-Practices Defences is that sweeping conclusions of
the Critics’ and Defenders’ arguments are unwarranted: they are illicitly motivated
by the simplistic way that philosophical expertise has been related to the expertise
defence. Acknowledging the variable relationship between philosophical expertise
and the expertise defence renders invalid any inference taking us from a small sample
of evidence for the expertise defence in one set of cases to a wholesale rejection or
acceptance of it in all cases. Given these considerations, it is possible to remain open-
minded about the expertise defence in advance of close study into the specific area
and practice to which it is being applied.
However, an important objection to such agnosticism is in the offing: even if Critics
cannot automatically draw large-scale negative metaphilosophical conclusions from
their empirical studies, they might claim that these studies—along with the lack of
countervailing evidence—justifies a strong presumption against the viability of any
version (local or global) of the expertise defence. In order to give some succour to
Defenders, we will now outline one example where robust empirical evidence supports
a successful instance of the expertise defence. We think that this approach of engaging
with Critics on empirical grounds is more edifying than arguing over where the burden
of proof lies in metaphilosophical debates; ideally Defenders and Critics will settle
their metaphilosophical differences by gathering and evaluating targeted bodies of
empirical evidence, not by attempting to claim temporary victories through dialectical
fiat.
4 A (very) narrow account of the expertise defence
4.1 Cognitive epistemology
One of the most promising recent developments in experimental philosophy is the
‘cognitive epistemology’ movement.17 Proponents of this movement seek to develop
psychological explanations of our intuitions that can help to assess their evidentiary
value. Recent studies in cognitive epistemology develop this approach by first tracing
intuitions back to the particular cognitive processes that give rise to them, and then
identifying vitiating circumstances in which our intuitions can lead us astray (e.g.,
Nagel 2010, 2012b; Fischer 2014; Alexander et al. 2015; Gerken and Beebe 2016;
Fischer and Engelhardt 2016, 2017b). Ultimately, the hope is to provide an ‘epistemic
profile’ of the cognitive processes underlying philosophical intuitions that allows us
to assess their evidential merit in specific types of philosophical inquiry.
A primary advantage of cognitive epistemology is that it facilitates a piecemeal
approach to investigations of the nature and epistemology of intuitions. In line with
our previous discussions, we suggest that this fine-grained approach to investigating
the epistemology of intuitions is fitting to assess the viability of the expertise defence.
In this sense, cognitive epistemology provides resources which can help to articulate
the two claims constitutive of the expertise defence:
17 This term is coined by Fischer (2014).
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1. Philosophers have philosophical expertise—adequate training in philosophy leads
to improved performance in some task(s).
2. Philosophical expertise defends philosophers from distorting factors that Critics
claim undermines the practice of appealing to intuitions in philosophy.
If cognitive epistemology pinpoints biases and their deleterious effects in philosoph-
ical theorising, then presumably we can also use these findings to evaluate whether
practices philosophers employ makes them less susceptible to these biases. That is,
we can ask: do philosophers happen to do the sorts of things that shields them from
the problematic effects of biases? We now argue that, for the application of one philo-
sophical practice to one specific philosophical puzzle, that the answer is ‘yes’.
4.2 Philosophical expertise and ordinary language analysis
To demonstrate the relevance of recent empirical work in vindicating a narrow version
of the expertise defence, we will look at the practices subsumed under the approach
of Ordinary Language Analysis (OLA)—for helpful reviews, see Hansen (2014) and
Baz (2016). Roughly put, OLA is the methodology which suggests that it can be
philosophically fruitful to pay careful attention to how we use particular words in
everyday contexts: the motivating idea is that this can help us to identify and resolve
philosophical difficulties that arise from the mismatch in how these words are used
in ordinary contexts, and in how philosophers use them in philosophical inquiry.18
In what follows, we argue that there is empirical evidence showing that the practices
of OLA, when applied within a particular line of inquiry, can give rise to a kind of
philosophical expertise that shields philosophers from a specific type of bias.19
Before proceeding, we should note that we assume that when a philosopher uses
OLA in attempting to solve a philosophical puzzle, the use of such techniques will be
informed by previous philosophical training. Of course, philosophical training is not
a necessary condition for deploying OLA—after all, this methodology presumably
relies on general capacities we employ to make sense of discourse in everyday life.
However, given that appeal to OLA in philosophical contexts requires careful attention
to philosophical texts, together with the ability to effectively reconstruct argument and
situate them among other philosophical theories, it is natural to expect that this skill
will typically result from extensive training in philosophy.
One of the high-water marks of ordinary language analysis is Austin’s Sense and
Sensibilia. One of the primary targets here is Ayer’s (1963) version of the so-called
‘Argument from Illusion’—a historically influential argument that has shaped many
debates in the philosophy of perception. This argument proceeds from descriptions
18 For further discussion, see Hansen (2014).
19 Although OLA nowadays has something of a bad name, it is important to note that one can adopt the
practices of OLA without subscribing to the more hefty methodological commitments that might have been
shared by its initial proponents. And indeed, the frequency with which considerations about linguistic data
are brought to bear on assessments of philosophical theories shows that OLA is alive and well today. For
a discussion, see Hansen (2014); for a contemporary (qualified) defence of OLA, see Hansen and Chemla
(2015) and Hansen (2017).
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of cases of non-veridical perception—i.e., cases where objects look or appear to have
properties they do not actually possess. For instance:
(A) A stick that normally looks straight may appear bent when it is seen in water.
Ayer (1963, p. 4) contends it is obviously implausible that a straight stick becomes bent
once put in water, or that the stick can be simultaneously both crooked and straight.
Therefore, if a stick can both appear to be straight in normal circumstances and look
bent when put in water, then this suggests that in at least one of these cases we are
not directly aware of the stick. Nevertheless, Ayer contends that even if the viewer is
not directly aware of the stick, they must be aware of something. This ‘something’ is
called a sense-datum, which is credited with the properties the stick appears to have.20
One of Austin’s central contentions is that proponents of the Argument from Illusion
get us into a muddle because they neglect the subtle implications of the verbs ‘looks’,
‘seems’ and ‘appears’ when describing cases of non-veridical perception (Austin 1962,
pp. 33–43). As Austin aptly points out, proponents of the Argument from Illusion take
themselves to use these appearance-verbs in a very distinctive way: specifically, they
employ them to indicate merely how things look/appear/seem to a viewer ‘there and
then’, without implying that viewers would be inclined to judge that things really are
that way. Thus, they assume (quite plausibly) that most people who read descriptions
like ‘a straight stick half-submerged in water appears bent to S’ will not infer that S
would be inclined to judge that the stick really is bent. After all, most of us would
know better than to judge that the stick is bent just because it appears to so be ‘there
and then’—we naturally assume that any other viewer would also know better.
However, as Austin skilfully teases out by way of a number of linguistic intuitions,
clauses of the form “X seems F to S” and “X appears F to S” imply just that. That is,
Austin proposes that these constructions generally convey that S would, lacking any
countervailing information, judge that “X is F” (Austin 1962, pp. 36–38). To illustrate,
imagine I claim that ‘the new bike lanes appear to be quite narrow’, or ‘the church
seems to be gothic’. In these cases, we ordinarily take the speaker to endorse the
content that comes after the appearance-verb. Of course, this doxastic implication can
be cancelled by explicit contradiction: E.g., if we say ‘the church seems gothic, but
was actually constructed only 10 years ago’, we take the relevant appearance-verb to
indicate only how things seem to the viewer ‘there and then’, without implying that she
judges things to be that way. However, absent such cancellations, we typically interpret
these verbs in their doxastic sense, and infer that subjects would judge accordingly.
Why is any of this relevant for the Argument from Illusion? The reason is that, when
describing cases of non-veridical perception, proponents of this argument intend to
use appearance-verbs in a purely phenomenal sense: that is, they take these verbs to
indicate only how things seem to a subject from that perspective, without implying
anything about their inclination to judge that things really are as they appear, look,
or seem to them ‘there and then’. However, as Austin points out, uncancelled uses of
appearance-verbs ordinarily have just this implication; moreover, this suggests that
20 Both Russell (1912) and Broad (1923) present the Argument from Illusion in ways very similar to Ayer.
However, it is noteworthy that contemporary reconstructions of this argument differ considerably from these
formulations (see, e.g., Smith 2002).
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uncancelled use of these verbs when describing non-veridical perception cases for the
Argument from Illusion might not suffice to indicate that these verbs are meant in
their purely phenomenal sense (Austin 1962, pp. 36–41). Therefore, as Austin is at
pains to do throughout, it is very important to make explicit exactly what is intended
by the use of certain appearance-verbs, and what is already known by the viewer. For
instance, one needs to be reminded of the situation one is in when it is claimed that a
stick half-submerged in water appears bent, and how this bears on the reading of the
relevant appearance-verb; after all, it is not implausible to think that in some cases one
could in fact suspect that the stick really is bent—say, when one did not previously
know that the stick was actually straight. Thus, Austin’s use of OLA calls attention
to the fact that, without due caution in our philosophical discussions, certain uses of
appearance-verbs can exert potentially confusing influences on our judgements.
So much for Austin’s application of Ordinary Language Analysis to the Argument
from Illusion; why think that this has any relevance to a successful expertise defence?
Here’s why: in a number of recent papers, Fischer et al. (2015, 2016, 2017b) provide
empirical evidence that supports Austin’s suspicions that misuse of appearance-verbs
in descriptions of cases of non-veridical perception gives rise to significant philosoph-
ical difficulties. In what follows, we first present details of this empirical research,
and then build on their findings to argue that Austin’s use of OLA in analysing the
Argument from Illusion is a clear display of significant philosophical expertise that
does lend support to the expertise defence.
The empirical research by Fischer et al. (2015, 2016, 2017b) is a prime example
of a project in cognitive epistemology: it aims to provide a psychological explana-
tion of the intuitions driving the Argument from Illusion, and then builds on this
explanation to assess their evidentiary value. The psychological explanation Fischer
et al. provide builds on a body of work in cognitive psychology on the process called
stereotype enrichment. This is a cognitive process that is key to our competence as
speaker/hearers of a language, and which plays a central role in both language pro-
duction and comprehension (Hare et al. 2009; Ferretti et al. 2001; McRae et al. 1997;
Atlas and Levinson 1981). To illustrate the operations of this process, consider the
following claim:
(Tomato) “She looked at the vibrant colour of the tomato”
Most people who read the claim above infer that I was looking at the colour red—rather
than green, orange, or yellow. Why do people immediately leap to this conclusion,
since the tomato could have been of any one of these other colours? One well-accepted
explanation is that, for most of us, tomatoes have a strong stereotypical association
with the colour red; this strong association is what facilitates the inference to the
conclusion that the viewer faces a particular colour (Atlas and Levinson 1981). In this
sense, we “enrich” the utterance with our stored information about the colours that
are stereotypically associated with tomatoes.
Stereotype enrichment is a generally reliable process for arriving at accurate con-
clusions about the world.21 For instance, most of the tomatoes we encounter in our
21 The explanation for this is that stereotypical associations are encoded in our semantic memory, which
evolves from frequent activation by repeated encounters with certain stimuli in the world (Neely 1991).
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daily lives are in fact red. However, there are obviously cases where such stereotype
enrichments can lead us astray. The following riddle is helpful to illustrate (Giora
2003, p. 13):
(S) A boy and his father get into a severe car accident. The father dies immediately,
and the boy is taken to hospital. In the emergency room, the surgeon looks at the
boy and says ‘I can’t operate on him. He’s my son.’ How is this possible?
Many people, when first exposed to this question, are stumped by it. A plausible
explanation for why people tend to be puzzled is the fact that the term ‘surgeon’ has a
strong gender stereotype. This strong stereotypical association immediately prompts
the leap to the conclusion that the surgeon must be the father—which, in turn, gives
rise to the confusion (‘But the father has died!’). This example illustrates how, even
under situations where we would expect the contextual information to trigger the non-
stereotypical meaning (viz., the use of ‘surgeon’ to pick out the boy’s mother), we
may still draw inferences that are ‘enriched’ by stereotypical associations.
In recent work, Fischer et al. (2015, 2016) argue that a similar kind of bias drives the
intuitions underlying the Argument from Illusion. One of the central lines of empirical
support for this claim is the evidence that all appearance-verbs (seems, appears, and
looks) have very strong stereotypical association with certain doxastic properties. In
more detail, Fischer et al. provide substantial empirical evidence—by way of a variety
of experimental methods—for the following proposal22:
(H) The assertion ‘x looks/appears/seems F to S’ stereotypically implies that S is
inclined to judge that x is F.
The central upshot of (H) is that people will ordinarily interpret all appearance-verbs
in their doxastic sense—i.e., to imply specific doxastic properties about the viewer.
This in itself may sound rather unsurprising; after all, the work of Austin already
suggests as much: we tend to interpret clauses of the form “x seems F to S” and
“x appears F to S” in this dominant doxastic sense, unless this meaning is explicitly
ruled out.23 However, the findings from Fischer et al. (2015, 2016, 2017b) build on
Footnote21 continued
Given that the strength of a link in semantic memory is directly correlated to the observed co-occurrence of
frequencies in the subject’s environment, semantic memory will then tend to encode accurate stereotypes
(e.g., most tomatoes are red). Of course, stereotypes are not always correct, and may be encoded by
misleading information in the world—e.g., biased media and uncooperative testimony.
22 These findings were obtained from two distinct experimental methods. The first is a distributional-
semantic analysis of these verbs within a vast linguistic corpus, which suggests there to be strong links
between these verbs and the relevant doxastic properties. The second was the use of a forced-choice task
where participants were asked to rate the plausibility of items where the complement of the appearance-verb
was inconsistent with doxastic inferences. Results showed ‘look’ and ‘appear’ to be strongly associated
with doxastic features, and ‘seem’ to be even more strongly associated with such features. Notably, this
last method can also be combined with experimental techniques of pupillometry, which tracks increase in
levels of cognitive effort by measuring the dilation of participants’ pupils. This method has been fruitful
in investigation of perception-verbs (‘see’ and ‘aware’), where results obtained from previous forced-
choice plausibility-ranking tasks with such verbs (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017a) were replicated in studies
employing techniques of pupillometry (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b).
23 Interestingly, Fischer et al’s work show that all appearance-verbs (including clauses of the form “x looks
F to S”, whose doxastic uses Austin (1962, p. 36) dismisses) have strong stereotypical associations with
certain doxastic properties.
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Austin’s suggestion in an important way: their findings show that these stereotypical
associations are so strong that people will tend to interpret these verbs in their doxastic
sense even in situations which invite the non-doxastic (phenomenal) interpretation of
these verbs.
This finding is surprising; because, as mentioned above, proponents of the Argument
from Illusion take it that people will interpret these verbs in their purely phenomenal
sense when they read descriptions of non-veridical cases of perception. That is, they
assume (quite plausibly) that in reading descriptions of cases such as ‘a large boat
viewed from afar appears small’, people will resist inferring that the viewer in these
cases is inclined to judge that the object viewed is actually small. Again, this assump-
tion is well-motivated: after all, most of us know very well that a large boat does not
actually possess the property of smallness because it is viewed from afar—and we
take it that other people would also not be tempted to so judge. However, the findings
from Fischer et al. show just that: people will indeed tend to interpret these verbs in
their doxastic sense when reading these kinds of cases—thus implying that in this
case the viewer would be inclined to judge that the object does have the properties it
looks/appears/seems to have. This in itself calls for an explanation: given the plausible
assumption that people would interpret these verbs in their phenomenal sense when
reading the kinds of cases that motivate the Argument from Illusion, why is it that they
still take them in their doxastic sense?
Relying on a large body of work from research in cognitive psychology, Fischer
and colleagues propose there is a rather natural explanation for this tendency. A clue
to the answer is found in explanation of the small riddle of the surgeon (S) presented
above. Recall, the explanation for why it can be so difficult to solve this riddle is
that the term ‘surgeon’ has a very strong gender stereotype with ‘male’. Indeed, as
the riddle helpfully illustrates, mere mention of the term will immediately prompt
the stereotype-driven inference that the surgeon is the father—even when the con-
text indicates that this conclusion is not possible. A similar kind of explanation can
account for people’s tendency to interpret appearance-verbs in their doxastic sense
when reading descriptions of cases of non-veridical perception. More precisely, the
strong stereotypical associations between appearance-verbs and the relevant doxastic
properties immediately drives the stereotype-driven inference that viewers are inclined
to judge that things are as they look/appear/seem to them. Moreover, like in the riddle
of the surgeon, this inference is activated even when contextual information indicates
otherwise—e.g., even in the light of the explicit information that the stick that looks
bent is straight.
Fischer et al. (2015, 2016) argue that this provides a psychological explanation for
why proponents (and readers) of the Argument from Illusion effortlessly leap from
descriptions of cases of non-veridical perception to the negative conclusion that in
such cases we are not aware of objects themselves. Very roughly put, the reason why
this conclusion seems to follow so naturally is that when people read, e.g., ‘a straight
stick half-submerged in water looks bent’, they then immediately infer that the viewer
is inclined to judge that the object viewed is bent. However, it is explicitly clear from
the description of the case that the stick is straight, rather than bent. This conflict
between the stereotype-driven inference (that the object viewed is judged to be bent)
and the explicit description of the case (where the stick is described as being straight)
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then leads to the conclusion that the viewer does not know what object she is viewing,
and is not aware of that object—but of something else.
The psychological explanation above reveals how the Argument from Illusion gains
its intuitive force by trading on a confusion between the phenomenal and doxastic
senses of the relevant appearance-verbs. This then suggests that the Argument from
Illusion is underwritten by an incisive kind of cognitive bias and that the intuitions
driving this argument are epistemically worthless. The particular bias in question is
traceable to an identifiable set of vitiating circumstances: specifically, this bias arises
because proponents of the Argument from Illusion make use appearance-verbs in
their less salient phenomenal sense when describing cases of non-veridical perception,
without making it explicit that this use deviates from the (dominant) doxastic sense
of these verbs. The unmarked use of this less salient technical sense leads competent
speakers to mistakenly draw inferences in line with the ordinary (doxastic) sense of
this verb, which conflict with the inferences that are natural to draw with respect to
its phenomenal sense. Moreover, it is precisely the confusion between the doxastic
and phenomenal senses of the relevant verbs that prompts the conflicting intuitions
driving the Argument from Illusion. Given that such linguistic confusions should have
no bearing whatsoever on philosophical investigations of the nature of perception,
then it is plausible to conclude that these intutions are epistemically defective.
Let us now return to the discussion of the expertise defence. We propose that the
empirical work of Fischer and colleagues reveals that Austin’s use of OLA amounts
to a form of philosophical expertise that does suffice to shield philosophers from cer-
tain biases, and therefore supports an instance of the expertise defence. As discussed
above, one of Austin’s central contentions was that proponent of the Argument from
Illusion get us into a muddle when they use appearance-verbs without due attention
to their subtle pragmatic implications. By paying attention to these implications, we
can avoid the misleading influences they can exert on our judgements. To support his
claim, Austin employed a Critical use of the vignettes motivating the Argument from
Illusions. As the empirical work of Fischer et al. demonstrate, Austin’s Critical exam-
ination of these cases is correct: the confusion Austin identifies is indeed the source
of what we take to be an uncontroversial instance of a bias.24 The bias in question
stems from the operation of a generally reliable cognitive process known as stereotype
enrichment which, due to the vitiating circumstances arising from misuse to the sub-
tle implication of appearance-verbs, gives rise to intuitions that have no evidentiary
value. In this way, the empirical evidence reviewed above shows that a specific form
of philosophical training (in OLA) can lead to improved performance in particular
practices surrounding the use of intuitions (using thought-vignettes in a Critical way
to uncover and suppress a bias stemming from a specific cognitive process) for the
purposes of improved philosophical inquiry into the nature of perception.
24 It is worth noting that this discussion suggests a further locus for philosophical expertise: framing verbal
descriptions of cases in such a way that can avoid engaging biases arising from linguistic confusions in
the first place. This form of expertise can be enabled by using empirical research in psycholinguistics,
which reveals the precise ways in that these linguistic confusions can lead us astray. E.g. see Fischer and
Engelhardt (2017b).
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Does this mean that ordinary language analysis suffices to defeat biases across the
board? Almost certainly not. As we have attempted to emphasise throughout this paper,
more care is required in attributions of philosophical expertise, and relating it to the
expertise defence. We have not provided evidence that ordinary language philosophy
can help to avoid problematic effects of other biases, or that its practices are truth-
conducive in other instances. But, this is not an unwelcome upshot of our view; as we
have suggested, this piecemeal approach is required to do justice to the complexity of
philosophical inquiry, and to provide a realistic evaluation of the expertise defence. It
remains to be seen whether the expertise defence can be upheld for other practices,
in other lines of philosophical inquiry. In advance of the careful empirical work that
is required to identify the processes driving cognitive biases, and considering how
these intersect with our current philosophical practices, we recommend an attitude of
studied agnosticism.
5 Conclusion
We have been exploring the viability of the expertise defence as a response to sceptical
claims regarding the use of intuitions in philosophy. By critiquing extant positions, we
found that both parties in this debate operate with an inadequate conception of philo-
sophical expertise. In responding to these worries, we have offered a novel account of
philosophical expertise that is sensitive to the variety of different practices and meth-
ods that comprise philosophical inquiry. This account better reflects the complex and
variable relationship between philosophical expertise and experimentally motivated
scepticism about intuitions. The upshot of our account is that we cannot vindicate or
reject the expertise defence all at once. Rather, we must adopt a nuanced and localised
approach that attends to the details of precisely what philosophical methods are being
used, and whether these methods suffice to shield philosophers from specific distort-
ing effects that skew our intuitions. And finally, we illustrated how one might take up
our novel approach by appealing to recent work in cognitive epistemology, which we
propose supports a local instance of the expertise defence. Our arguments show that
much work remains to be done on the extent to which appealing to philosophical exper-
tise can mitigate the negative implications of experimental philosophy; nonetheless,
we have offered a framework in which both parties to the debate can make concrete
progress.
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